Shareholders are organizing and mobilizing on new social media platforms like Twitter. This changes the dynamics of shareholder proxy contests in ways that favor shareholders over management. Disruptive technology may bring about a shareholder revolution, which may not be in shareholders' best interests, at least from the perspective of shareholder wealth maximization, and it also has powerful implications for the future of corporate social responsibility. 
INTRODUCTION
Twitter offers a platform for global social interaction. Twitter users send "tweets," which are a sort of 140-character text message to the world. About 500 million tweets are sent every day. This essay will focus on one type of collective action that many scholars have concluded simply does not work. Shareholder activism, which has long been plagued by collective action problems including rational apathy and free riding, could be rejuvenated by emerging social media tools like Twitter. Tweets are a cheap and easy way for shareholders to engage with each other and build consensus and support for collective action.
The notion that Twitter facilitates collective action is not new 2 (although this paper's application of Twitter to shareholder activism is novel). Twitter and other forms of social media have been widely adopted by marketing firms and political campaigns as a means of coordinating otherwise disconnected individuals and groups. Perhaps most famously, scholars of the Arab Spring widely credit Twitter, along with Facebook, YouTube, and other social information networks, with galvanizing Arab Spring activism.
3
The Arab Spring was a revolutionary movement that began in Tunisia on December 17, 2010 and erupted into large-scale protests across the Arab world by mid-2012. 4 The result of these civil uprisings was the overthrow of authoritarian and totalitarian leaders in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya. 5 The root causes of these mass protests are complex and multifaceted. But many scholars agree that a major catalyst 
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6

I. THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE TELEVISED
Many scholars have made analogies between corporations and nations. 7 A corporation's charter is often referred to as a "private constitution." 8 Shareholders have the right to elect the leaders of corporations, the board of directors, much as democratic citizens have the right to elect legislators. Those analogies are worth revisiting in an era where overly authoritarian nations risk being overthrown by the tweeting masses and their charismatic leaders.
It turns out that a lot of things can be said in 140 characters. For example, Carl Icahn, the famous activist investor, grabbed Wall Street and the tech world's attention when he tweeted caustically, "All would be swell at Dell if Michael and the board bid farewell." 9 However, the SEC-mandated disclosure that is supposed to be included on all publicsecurities-related communications is not among them.
10
Another 6. See, e.g., Howard et al., supra note 3 (analyzing over three million tweets, gigabytes of YouTube content, and thousands of blog posts. The study reported three main findings: (1) social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab Spring, (2) a spike in online revolutionary conversation often preceded major events on the ground and (3) social media helped spread democratic ideas across international borders). As a purely legal matter, Twitter is limited in its ability to facilitate shareholder activism. Shareholder communication rules are more liberal than ever, 11 but shareholder voting rules remain strictly limited by SEC rules and securities laws. Shareholders can and do use Twitter to communicate and become informed about important upcoming shareholder votes. For example, shareholders who would never rationally read a 300-page proxy statement might respond to a 140-character tweet. But if shareholders actually want to vote for a precatory proposal or against management, they still need to fill out a proxy card or attend the annual meeting to vote.
12
And the proposing shareholder still has to actually attend the meeting.
13
In an increasingly digital world, such traditional structures start to seem quaint, inconvenient, and unnecessary, leaving one to wonder why a physical meeting even needs to take place. rational shareholder will expend the effort necessary to make informed decisions only if the expected benefits outweigh the costs. Given the length and complexity of corporate disclosure documents, the opportunity cost entailed in making informed decisions is significant. In contrast, the expected benefits of becoming informed are quite low, as most shareholders ' 
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In fact, it is so onerous to attend the physical annual meetings that most shareholders do not go. 16 Instead they submit ballots to designated representatives who then tabulate them and vote by proxy.
17
Perhaps with the only exception being the widely followed and well-attended Berkshire-Hathaway annual meeting, most shareholders cannot justify the cost of exercising their voting rights in person. 18 Thus, a great deal of shareholders cast their vote without the benefit of annual meeting presentations and participatory question and answer sessions.
19
More shareholders might attend and vote electronically, if annual meetings were simulcast or otherwise electronically interactive.
20
The SEC could reform Rule 14a, which governs the public shareholder voting process, to allow voting online. The formal proxy solicitation process could be replaced by a more fluid and dynamic system to facilitate social media shareholder activism. With just a few liberalizing reforms, the SEC could usher in a new era of shareholder activism, perhaps even creating a new form of corporation, governed by shareholder direct democracy.
holdings are too small to have significant effects on the vote's outcome. Accordingly, corporate shareholders are rationally apathetic.").
16 In an interesting juxtaposition of history, Rule 14a was itself born in the crucible of war. In 1942, just a few months after the December 7th attack on Pearl Harbor-when democracy itself seemed mortally vulnerable to totalitarian regimes-Congress decided to bolster democracy at home through the institution of capitalism.
22
Congress determined that shareholders of public companies regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 lacked vital rights to voice their concerns about corporate mismanagement. Thus Congress passed, and the SEC promulgated, rules allowing shareholders to propose "precatory proposals" for a shareholder vote. The rules, Congress reasoned, would provide for a kind of "shareholder democracy." 
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The initial problem with precatory proposals was that they were just too easy to make.
25
Shareholders who had tiny stakes in huge companies could badger management with unrelated requests and pet projects. Over the course of the next fifty years, shareholders' rights to make proposals and communicate with each other about voting for proposals and directors was limited by a succession of amendments to Rule 14a. 26 In fact, Rule 14a is one of the most heavily amended rules in all of securities law. 27 The result of fifty years of pro-management amendments to Rule 14a was a shareholder voting system so convoluted and challenging that shareholder democracy virtually disappeared. 26. Rule 14a was amended with additional substantive and procedural restrictions in 1948, 1952, 1954, 1960, 1972, 1976, 1983 and 1987. 27. See Palmiter, supra note 22, at 882 ("Since its promulgation five decades ago, the rule itself has undergone no less than fourteen revisions.").
28. See id. ("Lately, the agency's interpretive flip-flops in no-action letters have become legion. . . . In short, the rule is today in chaos.").
29. Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (1993) ("The Commission's express goal was to make it easier for shareholders to communicate with each other, and the amendments certainly move in that direction. The SEC made important strides in that direction.").
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was nothing less than to change the dynamics of corporate governance in America. 30 Breeden recognized that the SEC had created a system that:
was supposed to protect shareholders [but] sometimes works to insulate management in problem cases from accountability to their shareholders . . . a system in which it takes the permission of the federal government, teams of lawyers and millions of dollars for shareholders to discuss the future of the company they own in a newspaper op-ed or on a radio talk show. 31 Mr. Breeden analogized the proxy system to an undemocratic political system:
If the current proxy rules for corporate elections applied to our national political elections, then every time citizens wanted to discuss their views of President Bush, Bill Clinton or Ross Perot, they would have to file a description of themselves and their views with the SEC. Discussing tonight's debate in the newspaper or on television would require mailing a proxy statement to every registered voter in the country.
32
On October 22, 1992, the SEC announced that, "[t]he purposes of the proxy rules themselves are better served by promoting free discussion, debate and learning among shareholder and interested persons, than by putting restraints on that process to ensure management has the ability to address every point raised in the exchange of views." 33 In accord with this newly espoused democratic shareholder philosophy, the SEC amended the Rule in many critical ways, including rewriting it in a user-friendly, question-and-answer format. 34 Prior to the 1992 amendments, the SEC generally pre-reviewed all shareholder communications regarding a shareholder vote. ("Prior to the 1992 amendments, the SEC generally performed a moderating function in proxy contests, tempering the more aggressive materials and forcing the contestants to provide factual support for their arguments and assertions. Now, the SEC no longer performs this function for most of the materials used in the contest."); see also An Overview of the Proxy Solicitation Rules, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES 9-13 (Amy L. Goodman et al. eds., 5th ed. 2013), available at http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/ WLRK.22925.13.pdf ("A benefit of circulating initial soliciting materials is that they are not subject to pre-review by the SEC staff. These materials are filed in definitive form with the SEC on the date they are first used, and can therefore be disseminated quickly and cost effectively to shareholders.").
38. Al Gore did not actually invent the Internet. This is a reference to a political gaffe by the former Vice President during his interview with Wolf Blitzer of CNN on 
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amended Rule 14a to allow companies to do so (rather than require companies to physically mail all that paper to shareholders).
40
Making shareholder communications cheaper was clearly a primary purpose of the SEC in enacting this amendment. 41 The SEC concluded that "[t]he amendments put into place processes that will provide shareholders with notice of, and access to, proxy materials while taking advantage of technological developments and the growth of the Internet and electronic communications." amendments may save the majority of the almost $1 billion annually spent on paper proxy mailings, the amendment also brought three notable costs: (1) the cost of preparing and sending a final paper notice to shareholders explaining that future notices would be on the Internet, (2) the cost of processing shareholders' requests for paper copies, which are to be available on demand and (3) the cost to shareholders of printing paper copies at home. Id. at 65. The highest estimate suggested the rule may potentially cost up to $100 million in website publishing, administration and home printing costs, although most of those costs can be avoided if shareholders simply view the proxy materials electronically instead of printing them. In addition to finding that the 2007 amendments would net nearly $900 million in annual savings, the SEC also found the amendments would improve the efficiency of the proxy voting process. Reg FD is a relatively new rule promulgated in August 2000. At that time, only reporters and large investors were invited to the quarterly analyst conference calls, where results of the past quarter were first disclosed. Small investors who traded over the Internet wanted equal access. Reg FD granted them equal access to material non-public information.
Eventually the SEC found that Reed Hastings' Facebook post did not violate Reg FD. 48 But that particular determination did not settle the SEC's general position on the issue because the SEC expressly stated that the Hastings decision had no precedential value, although the report did set out core principles. Accordingly, to avoid liability, companies and management now tend to file a Form FD and 8-K for every potentially material tweet, blog post or other social media missive. 
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But activist shareholders don't have to make these filings. 50 In contrast to Hastings' post, the SEC did nothing when Carl Icahn tweeted, "We currently have a large position in APPLE. We believe the company to be extremely undervalued." 51 Apple's stock price increased by nearly 5% on the day of Icahn's tweet, adding over $17 billion to its market capitalization at its intraday high.
52
Icahn has since become a poster child for Twitter activism, employing Tweets to announce new activist efforts to the market, with great effect. Icahn's brief dispatches of less than 140 characters have moved markets, including announcing a 6% stake in Canadian oil and gas explorer Talisman Energy, resulting in a 6.4% stock price increase in after-hours trading, 53 and announcing a 9.4% stake in Family Dollar Stores, resulting in a 9.7% stock price increase in after-hours trading.
54
Forbes described Icahn's use of Twitter to publicize an investment in Gannett as "typical Icahn fashion." Shares in the media company rose 5% in after-hours trading following Icahn's announcement. 55 50. Shareholders have some additional disclosure responsibilities after they become "material" filers pursuant to Regulation 13(d) or 13(g). Obtaining more than 5% of the outstanding stock or purchasing stock with the intent to solicit a tender offer can trigger material filer status. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2011 
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cheaper and more democratized. 58 Modern low-cost yet effective shareholder campaigns abound. For example, for four consecutive years shareholders have organized to press ExxonMobil and other oil and gas companies to disclose the dangers of hydraulic fracking.
59
Management vehemently opposed this corporate social responsibility initiative. But when the ExxonMobil shareholders got enough votes to pass a precatory proposal for fracking risk disclosure, management capitulated. 60 Other shareholder campaigns are less successful in moving management to change its policies, but they may yet be effective in accomplishing goals of awareness and corporate social responsibility. For example, Grassroots activist shareholders-who originally organized on the Internet-descended on Safeway's annual shareholder meeting to protest genetically modified ("GMO") foods. Inside the meeting, shareholders voted on a proposal to remove GMO foods from Safeway shelves that was proposed by the Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur, a Roman Catholic order, who owned 8,800 shares of Safeway stock, 61 representing only about 0.00173% of the outstanding shares at that time. 62 Only 2% of shareholders supported the proposal to remove GMO ingredients from its products, 63 and the proposal did not pass, but the demonstrations-which consisted of shareholders in biohazard suits
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A LITTLE BIRDIE SAID: HOW TWITTER 709 IS DISRUPTING SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM dumping Safeway produce in garbage bins in front of the hotel where the annual meeting was held-attracted significant media attention. 64 Another grassroots movement, 99% Power, an offshoot from the Occupy Wall Street movement, 65 organized protests at the shareholder meetings of major banks during their annual meetings in Spring 2012.
66
At least 500 protesters gathered at the Wells Fargo annual shareholders meeting, of which about two dozen were arrested for chaining themselves together to block entry to the meeting at the bank's headquarters and for entering the meeting and interrupting CEO John Stumpf during his presentation. 67 The protest, which included signs that read "Hells Fargo" and hand-outs of dollars bills with an image of a stagecoach (Wells Fargo's corporate logo) pulled by human beings with the caption "Debt Slavery," became so active that some shareholders were not allowed to enter the meeting. Just like the physical protests in the Arab Spring that were organized through social media platforms, grassroots shareholder activism can be organized and empowered by Twitter and Facebook. In fact, the Wells Fargo protest was planned, organized and broadcast live using social media. The web site "Stop Wells Fargo" was established to focus attention on and raise support for "major disruptions" at the Wells Fargo shareholder meeting. 73. Bulldog Investors is run by activist investor Phillip Goldstein, who is notable for his consistent value-oriented investment strategy. Goldstein identifies companies that appear to be undervalued because of mismanagement and seeks to replace management.
74. Occupy Wall Street was a grassroots protest movement characterized by concerns with global and social inequality but lacking central leadership or a clear
2015]
A LITTLE BIRDIE SAID: HOW TWITTER 711 IS DISRUPTING SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM has noted that activism through social media is inherently different from "classic" activism. It is not, "we are going to tout the party line, we are going to say what the NGOs are telling us to say." Instead, King notes that it is, "we are going to personalize it. And this can catch activists by surprise. They may have gotten the ball rolling, but what actually occurs falls out of the control of any hierarchical entity." 76 The most poignant distinction is that grassroots shareholder activism can quickly become unpredictable.
Grassroots shareholder activism is not necessarily directed at unlocking shareholder value. There have been numerous studies on whether shareholders' ability to control or at least reign in corporate activity increases share prices. 77 This inquiry is particularly pertinent to the shareholder social media activism. Many grassroots shareholder campaigns are sponsored by shareholders with minimal holdings. The old name for these pesky shareholders was "corporate gadflies." Non-profits have formed solely to purchase minimal amounts of securities and leverage Rule 14a to make precatory proposals to major message. In fact, Adbusters lampooned the movement in a poster for it that read, "What is our one demand? #occupywallstreet September 17
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corporations. As You Sow, a non-profit founded in 1992 to increase corporate accountability, launched its shareholder activism program in 1997, 80 whereby As You Sow would purchase $2,000 in securities, hold them for one year, then make precatory proposals related to various social issues.
81
Corporate social responsibility activist As You Sow is a perfect example of how a shareholder may purchase securities for purposes other than value creation.
Whether shareholder democracy is good or bad is an immensely personal and political question. Corporate law has not-and may never-settle on whether corporations must maximize shareholder wealth or prioritize corporate social responsibility. It is clear, however, that social media, in an age of already increasing shareholder democracy and activism, is a powerful new tool for proponents of corporate social responsibility.
III. TECHNOLOGY AND DEMOCRATIC SHAREHOLDER REFORMS
A public corporation is similar to a republic in that both employ representative democracy. Shareholders delegate broad decision-making powers to a board of directors, just as voting citizens delegate lawmaking powers to legislators. A direct democracy, 82 on the other hand, allows citizens to directly partake in voting on policy 80 . This program was formerly described on the website of As You Sow under a section titled "Our Methods," but that non-profit has since removed any explanation of its methods from its web site. Instead, their tactic is now described in a blurb titled "Power of the Proxy" on their web site. Our Work, AS YOU SOW, http://www.asyousow.org/our-work/.
81. See id. As You Sow has proposed shareholder votes on topics including: no smoking in movies (not only in the theatre but also on the screen), keeping nanomaterials and genetic modifications out of food, reducing consumer packaging, eliminating child labor from cotton fields in Uzbekistan and mineral mines in the Congo and reducing executive compensation.
82 Certain businesses may benefit from direct shareholder democracy while others may be harmed by it. Highly secretive firms like Apple, for instance, may find their bottom line is hit hard when decisions are made by the masses. Organic food retailers like Whole Foods, however, may find shareholder direct democracy gives them legitimacy in a marketplace where shoppers choose the most transparent and community oriented company.
In point of fact, many corporations today voluntarily expend money, make disclosures, and commit to social-benefit promises to become certified as benefit corporations, or B-corporations.
88
A Bcorporation is a type of for-profit entity that has some non-profit characteristics (but not its tax-exempt treatment). The shareholders of a B-corporation agree (at least theoretically) to evaluate the company based on its societal or environmental impact, and not solely on its profits.
The corporate landscape is changing. Corporations have a broader range of purposes than they did even a few short years ago. The world is 85 88. Today, there are at least twelve third-party companies that provide standards and evaluations to register as a "B-corporation." "B-corporation" is not a legal status. The designation is more like a USDA Organic certification. Most B-corporations are, from a legal perspective, Delaware corporations that do not make the "S" election. 
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Corporate America is not immune to these changes. New forms of corporations are emerging, as are new forms of corporate governance, and new goals of investors. In light of these changes, the SEC has the opportunity to unlock shareholder governance, allowing states to create new kinds of corporations. Justice Brandeis famously stated that, "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."
89
Shareholder direct democracy is a prime example of just such an economic experiment. Continuing the trend of shareholder empowerment exemplified by states like North Dakota, 90 a courageous state might take on Delaware's hegemony over incorporation by offering shareholders an unprecedented level of influence and involvement in the companies they own.
One way to unlock new shareholder governance regimes is simply to allow Internet voting. The shareholder annual meeting is an anachronism. It imposes great expenses on shareholders, effectively excluding many would-be participants. The direct beneficiaries of the current system are the institutional investors. Small shareholders who cannot afford to attend the meeting are excluded from the process, or at the very least left with limited access to information and diminished interaction with board members and management, just as small shareholders who were not invited to attend the quarterly analyst calls were excluded from timely receiving material non-public information.
Corporations will either modify their bylaws to allow virtual shareholder meetings and Internet voting, or they will preserve the status quo. By opening up a new avenue for shareholder engagement, the SEC will create an opportunity for the market to decide what mixture of shareholder corporate control it values most-even if that control is democratized.
